

due to the specific nature of the chemical needed for effective ant control. More than 300 chemicals were screened when the mirex bait was developed (34). Some 36 chemicals have been screened during the past 2 years and about 100 are currently undergoing tests.

Biological control by predators, parasites, and insect diseases could reduce but not eliminate the imported fire ant. Studies on biological control have also been undertaken by the Agricultural Research Service. As yet, these studies have proven unproductive and show no signs of producing a usable control technique within the foreseeable future. Some other methods of insect control have also been evaluated such as chemosterilants, pheromones, attractants, and traps. However, to date, none of these have shown any promise either.

4. Abandonment of All Efforts to Control or Eradicate the Imported Fire Ant:

Abandonment of all efforts to control the imported fire ant would quickly lead to re-infestation of areas in which previous programs have effected control or elimination of the fire ant.

In the absence of an organized program, some indirect control would result assuming that other regulatory programs continue. For example, treatment of nursery stock to prevent spread of white-fringed beetle or other pests could partially check distribution of the imported fire ant to noninfested areas.

Abandonment would surely result in continued deterioration of the quality of the environment for man in infested areas just as it would avoid residues in nontarget organisms.

5. Relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance of long-term productivity

The control program will remove the ant from the environmental niche previously occupied by the pest. Some of these may be permanently occupied by other organisms with similar environmental requirements. The current and planned fire ant control program may have the following effects:

1. Restore the areas treated to its natural state by reducing the fire ant to an insignificant factor in the ecosystem.
2. Limit the infested area generally to its present periphery.
3. Residues in omnivorous and predaceous invertebrates and vertebrate animals will develop and continue in treated areas with potential impact on such populations. This is due to the necessity for repeated treatments for control. Continued exposure of imported fire ant populations over the years to mirex may lead to development of resistance.
4. Elimination of most of the ants will open their ecological habitat to occupation by other organisms with similar environmental requirements. This will involve organisms which occupied this niche previous to replacement by imported fire ant.
5. Invertebrates upon which fire ants prey may temporarily increase in numbers.
6. Irreversible short-term impact versus long-term on environment

The use of mirex at the low dosage results in no irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources.

Consultation with Federal, State, and Local Agencies

The imported fire ant program is cooperative in all functions with the State. Overall objectives in each State are planned jointly, yearly goals are carried out jointly, and financing of the control phase is basically on a 50-50 basis. Quarantine action is under parallel Federal-State regulations and is carried out jointly. A Memorandum of Understanding is prepared and cosigned with the States, and the program is documented by detailed work plans.

The program proposed for 1971 was devel-

oped jointly with officials of the affected States.

LIST OF EXHIBITS — BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Markin, G. P. 1970. Affidavit of George P. Markin Nos. 1 and 2, Filed on November 3, 1970, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil No. 2319-70.
- Affidavit No. 1 Review of the imported fire ant and the insecticide mirex.
- Affidavit No. 2 Status of the USDA, ARS, research program on the imported fire ant and its control.
2. Map showing the present range of the imported fire ant, and the potential range of this pest based on the average mean winter temperature of 40° F., (the mean winter temperatures of its furthest northern point of successful establishment).
3. National Academy of Sciences. 1967. Report of Committee on the Imported Fire Ant.
4. Butler, R. D. 1968. Report of the survey of county agents on the Imported Fire Ant. ARS, USDA, Office of the Administrator, January 15, 1968.
5. Photo showing boy's arm after being attacked by the Imported Fire Ant.
6. Summaries of case histories of attacks by the Imported Fire Ant on man and animal in 1970 in the State of Mississippi. Information compiled from replies to 220 inquiries sent out by the Mississippi Commissioner of Agriculture to medical doctors and veterinarians.
7. Ross, J. B. 1971. News release on the imported fire ant, News from MDAC (Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce).
8. Photos of Imported Fire Ant mound in various habits.
9. Wilson, E. O., and EADS, J. H. 1949. A report on the Imported Fire Ant *Solenopsis saevissima* var. *richteri* Forel in Alabama. Special report to Alabama Department of Conservation.
10. Smith, M. R., 1949. Report on Imported Fire Ant Investigations, Special Report Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
11. U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1954. The Imported Fire Ant, How to Control It. USDA, ARS, Leaflet 350.
12. Culpepper, G. H. 1953. Status of the Imported Fire Ant in the Southern States in July 1953. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine. E-867, 8 pp.
13. Favorable affidavits and resolution in favor of controlling or eradicating the Imported Fire Ant.
14. Index of Congressional Records (Senate and House) by fiscal years on Imported Fire Ant (1958-1971).
15. Environmental Defense Fund and CLEAN v. Clifford M. Hardin. 1970. Complaint for Injunction and Declaratory Judgment, Applicable Statute, Jurisdiction and Description of the Parties, File on August 5, 1970, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil No. 2319-70 by Edward Lee Rogers and Jon T. Brown. 17 pp.
16. Environmental Defense Fund et. al. v. Clifford M. Hardin. Secretary of Agriculture et. al., Civil Action No. 2319-70, Affidavit, filed in the United States District Court, for the District of Columbia.
17. Sports Fishing Institute. 1970. Massive environmental pollution. Bulletin No. 217, p. 5-6.
18. Coon, D. W. and Fleet, R. F. 1970. The Ant War. Environment No. 10:28-38.
19. Lambou, V. W. 1970. Evaluation of Water Quality Effects of the Program to Control the Imported Fire Ant with Mirex.
20. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service 1970. Status Report of Research on the Imported Fire Ant—Immediate and long-range potentials and goals.
21. A general bibliography on the imported fire ant and the insecticide mirex, through 1970.

22. Duke, T. W. 1970. Quarterly project progress report, USDA mirex study, U.S. Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Field Station, Gulf Breeze, Florida. Period July 1, 1970, through September 30, 1970.

23. ARS, USDA, Plant Protection Division, 1970. Results of monitoring mirex residues in terrestrial, amphibious, and aquatic organisms in Georgia. Progress Report.

24. Markin, G. P. 1970. Environmental Distribution of the Insecticide Mirex, Unpublished Report covering 1968-1970 Study of Treatment of Cat Island.

25. Van Valin, C. C., Andrews, A. K., and Eller, L. L. 1968. Some effects of mirex on two warm-water fishes. Transaction American Fisheries Society 97(2):185-193.

26. Dewitt, J. B., Stickel, W. H., and Springer, P. F. 1963. Pesticide-Wildlife Studies, Patuxent Wildlife Research Center, 1961-1962. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Circular 167:74-88.

27. Dewitt, J. B., Menzie, C. M., Spann, J. W., and Bance, C. 1964. Pesticide Wildlife Studies, Evaluation of Chemicals. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Circular 98:78-112.

28. Baker, M. F. 1964. Studies on possible effects of mirex bait on the bobwhite quail and other birds. Proc. 18 annual Conference Southeastern Association of Fish and Game Commissioners, pp. 153-159.

29. Naber, E. C., and Ware, G. W. 1965. Effect of kepone and mirex on reproductive performance in the laying hen. Poultry Science 44:875-880.

30. Butler, P. A. 1969. Monitoring Pesticide Pollution, BioScience, 19(10):899-891.

31. Ware, G. W. and Good, R. E. 1966. Effects of Insecticides on Reproduction in the Laboratory Mouse, II Mirex, Dieldrin, and DDT.

32. Gaines, T. B. and Kimbrough, R. D. 1969. The oral toxicity of mirex in adult and suckling rats, Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 14(B): 631-2.

33. Innes, J. R. M. et. al. 1969. Bioassay of pesticides and industrial chemicals for tumorigenicity in mice: a preliminary note, Journal, National Cancer Institute 42(b) 1101-1114.

34. Lofgren, C. S., Stringer, C. E., Banks, W. A., and Bishop, P. M. 1967. Laboratory tests with Candidate Bait Toxicants against the Imported Fire Ant. U.S. Agricultural Research Service 81-14, February 1967.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business?

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DEFENSE OF U.S. AIR SUPPORT IN LAOS

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, the Democratic policy committee has called for withdrawal of all U.S. forces engaged in both air and ground support from Indochina by the beginning of 1973. This is a matter that causes me great concern.

I agree that that is a worthy objective, but one, I submit, that will not be advanced by partisan action but which will most likely be achieved by continued

February 24, 1971

U.S. air support of South Vietnamese efforts to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and by nonpartisan unity behind our President and Commander in Chief.

Administration spokesmen have said repeatedly they are convinced that cutting off the major supply line of the North Vietnamese, the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex, will, more than any other single effort in Indochina, bring a quick end to the Vietnam war.

I question, then, why war critics both inside and outside the Congress criticize our President for supplying U.S. air support to the Laos trail mission when it appears to offer the greatest hope for bringing our boys home sooner.

Mr. President, I object to the repeated implications that the President is committing the United States to greater involvement in Indochina rather than working toward phasing out our involvement.

Certainly the facts do not bear out such implications. These facts are clearly set out in a column by Joseph Alsop in the Washington Post of February 22. I ask unanimous consent that this article be published in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

LIGHT AND HEAVY NEWS

(By Joseph Alsop)

If there is anything more trivial than yesterday's newspaper column, it is hard to know what it may be. Yet an old column by this reporter has just brought down the thunders of four admired colleagues—an honor indeed!

It would not be worth mentioning, except that it has a certain symbolic significance. Rightly or wrongly, after all, the United States by now has a heavy investment of blood and treasure in the Vietnamese war. What mainly matters, therefore, is what happens in Vietnam. But while Washington trivia gets so much attention, what is really happening in Vietnam is quite impossible to discover from each morning's news.

To make this contrast worse, what is happening in Vietnam grows daily more significant. It is a 10-to-1 bet, for instance, that only a tiny minority of those who read these words will have grasped the fact that there is serious fighting going on in Cambodia.

The fact itself has been dimly recorded, here and there. Yet neither the nature, nor the purposes, nor the meaning of the South Vietnamese offensive in this part of Cambodia have found their way into print.

The nature of the fighting is simple enough. The flamboyant but able General Do Cao Tri is leading his South Vietnamese forces against the enemy, in what was supposed to be the new North Vietnamese fortress-base-area in Cambodia. With less than two South Vietnamese divisions, General Tri has been taking on Hanoi's Fifth, Seventh and Ninth divisions—which used to be three of the most feared enemy units in South Vietnam.

The grisly "Body Counts" (originally introduced by the U.S. Army to appease the New York Times) have already mounted to above 1,200 North Vietnamese soldiers. It is a simple rule that any unit having 40 percent of its men killed in action, is a unit effectively put out of action itself. This means the equivalent of two enemy regiments already crossed off the list—at least for the time being.

If the Ho Chi Minh trail-complex is successfully cut in Laos, the "time being" is likely to be indefinitely long. Worse still, the

enemy's rate of loss is currently running at an average of 100 men per day. And this is the proportional equivalent, for North Vietnam, of an American loss of 1,000 men per day. Meanwhile, General Tri's losses have been painful but small.

THIS almost-ignored Cambodia campaign, therefore, has very great potential meaning. If all goes well (and that is always a very big "if") the enemy's forces in Cambodia will be torn to ribbons, and their laboriously established new base areas will be knocked to smithereens. This can happen before the present dry season ends. Already, moreover, by their performance in the field, General Tri's troops have strikingly proved the worth of President Nixon's scheme of Vietnamization.

As to the concurrent invasion of Laos, to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail-complex, it has caused more public turmoil than General Tri's operation in Cambodia. But there has been an almost equal paucity of information about its nature and its meaning.

The Laos operation's risks should not be underrated, to begin with. If the South Vietnamese under General Hoang Xuan Lam attain their ultimate objectives, they will own a swathe of the trail-complex about 50 miles wide and 35 miles deep. That means the equivalent of two South Vietnamese divisions holding a salient whose northern and southern flanks will each be 35 miles long—and in very rough, enemy-infested country!

The very fact that General Creighton Abrams has been eager to mount such an operation, speaks volumes about his confidence in Vietnamization. If the operation succeeds, (and the "if" is again crucial) about 130,000 North Vietnamese troops and support personnel will also be cut off to the south of the trail—cut, at any rate until the next dry season begins in December, 1971.

Proportionally, that means for Hanoi the equivalent for Washington of 1,300,000 Americans left without supply, reinforcement, and in a good many cases, even without rations, for a period of 10 months. Of the readers who have followed this report thus far, one wonders how many have previously been made aware of that remarkable fact, or of more than the tiniest proportion of the other foregoing facts.

The world's first Stalinist, the Chinese political philosopher, Lord Shang, remarked bleakly about 2,400 years ago, "If a state emphasizes the light and ignores the heavy, that state is doomed." The rule can one day apply to the trade of reporting facts, like the silly business of alleged Panther-genocide.

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, the United States began supplying air support to South Vietnamese troops in Laos February 8.

Since that time government spokesmen have reported significant strides in the effort to totally block out North Vietnamese supply movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail south to Vietnam.

South Vietnamese ground troops are now holding positions on two strategic routes which constitute the greater trunk of the trail complex. The North Vietnamese are now waging fierce attacks on those ground troops, a sign that the enemy indeed considers access to the trail essential.

South Vietnamese troops have been able in the last 2 weeks to destroy 134,000 gallons of fuel, a service station capable of repairing 30 trucks a day, and 115 vehicles.

They have cut an important POL line which will severely limit the enemy's supply of oil and gas for their vehicles.

An administration spokesman reports the combined efforts of South Vietnamese ground troops and U.S. air support are inflicting heavy enemy losses. The enemy reportedly has lost in excess of 2,000 men, while U.S. losses were less than 3 percent of that figure.

Mr. President, a year-and-a-half ago I personally visited with South Vietnamese General Lam. He convinced me his troops are dedicated to their mission of defending their country and would continue that effort to the limit of their capability. They are dedicated to retaining their freedom, and I am convinced that they will accomplish their mission by assuring the security of their country.

The administration has repeatedly emphasized it has put no ground troops in Laos and has no intentions of doing so in the future. It has pointed out that air support in Laos is a vital means to the end we all want to achieve: that of bringing the Vietnam conflict to a speedy end.

I believe we should furnish vital air support to the South Vietnamese troops to accomplish their objective and ours.

Mr. President, it would appear that those who continue to criticize the administration for supplying air support in Laos are not bothering to look below the surface facts before unloading their invective on the President. If their advice were followed, and we withdrew support, the war would be prolonged and death losses of friend and foe alike would rise.

As a result, the critics are doing their country a disservice by advocating a measure that would likely prolong the conflict.

THE INDOCHINA WAR

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I know I speak for millions of Americans in expressing deep dismay over the unending rhetoric of progress being used by our national leadership in describing the Indochina war.

It is a rhetoric which grossly misleads our Nation's people and disguises the mounting violence and widening character of the conflict.

It is a rhetoric which conveniently ignores an expanding American involvement and new commitments.

It is a rhetoric which tragically evades genuine concern—let alone some responsibility—for the devastating impact the conflict is having on the civilian population and countryside of the entire area.

It is on this latter point—on what a correspondent recently called "a slaughter of innocents"—that I wish to comment briefly today.

I am prompted to do so, not merely because the longstanding problems of refugees and civilian casualties continues, but also to underscore that the latest ingredient in our national policy of violence for Southeast Asia, can only add heavily—and needlessly—to the horrendous human toll that already exists.

Our national leadership has now officially told us that all of Indochina is a target of American bombs. The President has said that he would place no limitation on the use of American airpower throughout the area.

A Chinese Puzzle in the Jungle: Work Stops on New Laos Road

By TILLMAN DURDIN
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Feb. 14— Highway One, the mystery road the Chinese Communists are building from Yunnan Province of China into northern Laos, has become more of a puzzle than ever.

Although surveying continues, extension of the route has been stopped. The halt may be temporary — sources here who keep track of activities on the road assume that it is — but it is nevertheless puzzling since the present dry season would be a logical time for construction to be pushed as fast as possible. It has aroused speculation that the road will not be completed to the point for which it appears headed on the banks of the Mekong River before the year's rains come in June or July.

Earlier progress led observers here to predict last year that the road would reach the Mekong village of Pak Beng by the end of this dry season.

The highway, on which construction has been proceeding for several years, now extends from Mengla in Yunnan Province 100 miles into Laos as far south as Muong Houn. Muong Houn is 30 miles from Pak Beng.

Road Is Well Guarded


A branch of the road cuts off northeast at Muong Sai, a point about 40 miles into Laos from the China border, seemingly aiming for a linkup with a road into North Vietnam that leads to Dien Gienphu.

But work has also stopped on this branch. A gap of several miles and the Nam Ou River, still unbridged, separate the end of the branch and the beginning of the road on the other side of the Nam Ou.

The Chinese road, as far as it goes, is reported by aerial reconnaissance to be a fine, broad, laterite-topped, two-lane artery. Pilots who occasionally fly planes over or near it and get shot at attest to the fact that it is well guarded by anti-aircraft batteries.

A charter plane that got too close to the road recently just managed to get back to Luang Prabang in Laos with several holes in its wings and fuselage made by the Chinese guns.

If the road is eventually rushed to Pak Beng it will provide trucks with an overland route from the Chinese border to a navigable waterway over which cargoes could be transported north to where the Me-



The New York Times Feb. 21, 1971
Communist China has held up construction of road from Muong Houn (1) to Mengla (2).

kong becomes the Thai border or east toward Luang Prabang.

If the roads' builders chose they could continue the road from the south side of the Mekong to the Thai border, which is 25 miles below the Mekong in this area.

The fact that surveying continues from the present end of the road to Pak Beng would seem to indicate the Chinese plan to build this stretch.

Many perfectly ordinary considerations could explain the suspension of construction. Building materials may have run short or the Chinese may simply have decided the project is not as pressing as they once thought it was and have slowed down their building program.

But observers, who have always wondered what role the road was intended to fulfill, cannot help but speculate that the Chinese may have decided it is not very important after all and never finish what must be a very costly venture. It runs through a mountainous, sparsely-populated jungle region.

"Right now in the state it is in," one American observer here remarked, "it looks to me like a road built simply for the convenience of those who are building it."

Those who are building it are Chinese Army engineers with a good assortment of modern equipment. If they were now to resume work at full steam they could reach the Mekong by mid-year. Maybe they will, maybe they won't.

"If I can see that," the officer said, "I wonder why the MPs don't know it."

CURB SERVICE

American convoy drivers are also good customers. It is believed that many of them buy for resale.

Large communities of Vietnamese who live near the Long Binh base or near highways where American convoys pass have made small fortunes selling marijuana and heroin.

In the little town of Tam Hie about 20 miles from Saigon on route 1, which curves by the Long Binh base, the sellers are adolescent girls. An older woman explained why.

"It is harder for boys to approach military convoys because they might be thought of as Viet Cong," she said in Vietnamese.

She has a 17-year-old daughter, still in school, who often sells on route 13.

"More white Americans buy heroin from us than the black ones do," the schoolgirl said. "If you see an American sniffing the white opium, you will certainly die laughing. His hands shake violently when he is handed it. Immediately he begins to sniff it. Then he closes his eyes as if he is going to faint."

The girl gave a chuckle and added: "Some minutes later he wakes up and looks more intelligent."

It is believed that most of the heroin—derived from morphine, one of the alkaloids in opium—comes from Laos, but the girl and her mother do not know its source. Both said, however, that the local supply probably came from Chinese merchants in Cho Lon, the huge suburb of Saigon and once its Chinese twin city.

Not all the drugs are pure. The schoolgirl said that dried grass or tea leaves were often added to marijuana and that sugar was added to heroin.

One reason American soldiers give for using heroin is that compared with prices in America, it is cheap.

"There aren't many bargains here, either," one soldier said glumly.

THE DEBT AND THE DANGER WHEN JOHNNY COMES MARCH- ING HOME

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, one of the sad aftermaths of this war, and one which will be with us at least as long as any other, is the problem of the returning veteran.

In this connection, I ask unanimous consent that an article by James Reston in the Kansas City Times of Monday, March 8, "The Debt and the Danger When Johnny Comes Home," be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE DEBT AND THE DANGER WHEN JOHNNY COMES HOME

WASHINGTON.—So "the boys," as we call them, are coming back from the war.

What are they coming back to? And what are they bringing back with them—what thoughts, what dreams, what habits?

It is easier to answer the first question than the second. They are coming back to a divided country, which has five million unemployed and a dwindling market for unskilled labor; a fabulously rich country with a shortage of houses as well as jobs, and a surplus of inflation and social tension—scarcely "a land fit for heroes."

We do not know what they are bringing back with them, but we know they are no longer "boys." They are men trained in violence and guerrilla warfare, many of them no doubt resentful of their contemporaries who stayed at home, many more brutalized by battle or corrupted by cheap and strong

drugs, all of them expecting, and rightfully so, useful work and a decent life.

No doubt a majority of them, as in past wars, will slip back under the orderly and civilizing routine of work and family. General Westmoreland, for example, is persuaded that the discipline of Army life will prove to be a stronger and more lasting force than the brutality or the corruption.

Still, even if he is right, even if they are not a problem or a danger, they are surely a debt. At least on this we should be able to agree, regardless of our views on the war. It is not a debt that can await the slow return of "full employment" or "stable prices," both of which may be far down the road. Many of them are going to be mental casualties or even prisoners of war at home—restless, frustrated and out of work.

The government, of course, is conscious of all this. There is a demobilization program designed to ease the transition back to civilian life, hospital care for the wounded, educational assistance for the yearners, medical and psychiatric help for the drug addicts—even a careful security watch just in case—but the sum of all this is pitifully small compared to the magnitude of the problem.

Lately there has been a lot of talk in Washington about priorities, allocation of resources, revenue sharing and local responsibility for local problems. The Congress is deeply divided on all these. The Senate has not even been able to agree on its own rules of procedure, let alone getting down to legislating on urgent questions of policy.

The returning veterans, however, are a special question, a first priority, an obvious test for revenue sharing and local responsibility, and they need federal money and special help much faster than they are getting it now.

What is happening in most cases, despite the help of veterans' organizations and federal assistance, is that most of them are thrown in with the rest of the unemployed to seek jobs or welfare as best they can.

During the autumn months of 1970, according to the latest figures, the amount of public welfare increased faster than ever before, partly as a result of returning veterans, and already threatens to drive welfare costs up at least 1.5 billion dollars above the estimates in President Nixon's 1972 budget.

In explaining the steep rise in the nation's unemployed during the last year the administration has "blamed" much of it on the reduction in the armed forces and the layoffs in factories working for the Pentagon, but very little has been said of the human plight of the returning veterans.

The politics of this problem is not an unsurpassable barrier. Few federal legislators of whatever persuasion are prepared to vote against appropriations for veterans jobs—even if this means financing public service work under the states, cities, counties and municipalities of the country.

Meanwhile, much could be done by private employers in every community if separate lists of local veterans were compiled and local committees were established to help employ the veterans as a first priority.

At the present time, the major complaint in Washington, both in the executive and the legislative branches of the government, is that officials feel trapped in vast controversies and cannot get action on new welfare, housing or job training projects.

On the conduct of the war there is of course a bitter stalemate. On the conditions of a negotiated peace and on the future of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos it is the same. But the problem of the veterans is not a major divisive issue. The debt and the danger are widely recognized, but somehow they have been shoved aside by the more dramatic political and economic arguments.

Seldom is a speech made here about the war without verbal tribute being paid to the

men of the expeditionary force and to the extraordinary sacrifices they have made under conditions unprecedented in the history of the armed forces.

But this does not really help the veterans. They need money and jobs, and the cost of providing them is likely to be far less in the long run than the cost of paying for the consequences of indifference.

LAOS, CAMBODIA, VIETNAM, AND TOMORROW

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, during the years that I paid periodic visits to South Vietnam in an effort to obtain the truth about this tragic war, no newspaperman appeared to know more about what was really going on out there than did Robert Shaplen.

In the March 6 issue of the New Yorker magazine, Mr. Shaplen has written from Saigon a thoughtful and penetrating analysis of current conditions in that war theater, including also recent relatively new developments in Laos and Cambodia.

I ask unanimous consent that this interesting military-political analysis of these present tragic wars be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection the analysis was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LETTER FROM INDO-CHINA SAIGON, FEBRUARY 25

The invasion of Laos by South Vietnamese troops with American support seemed to offer at best some dubious short-term rewards and at worst a potential disaster. The risk was great, for as we have been reducing the number of our forces in Indo-China we have actually been increasing our commitment and involvement here—first in Cambodia and now in what is described as an "incursion" into Laos, which began in full force on February 8th. It is still too soon to render a firm appraisal of the venture, whose purpose, according to the Americans who persuaded their South Vietnamese allies to attempt it, was to cut through some of the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex, thus "turning the tap," as one American commander put it, and reducing to a trickle the flow of North Vietnamese traffic southward. The traffic had been growing heavier. Between the first of January and mid-February, the North Vietnamese poured thirty-one thousand new soldiers in at the top of the Trail, and trucks carrying supplies were moving down at the rate of twelve hundred a month—a considerable increase in both men and materiel over the average monthly flow in 1970. Most of these resources were probably headed for South Vietnam, though perhaps a third of them were destined for Cambodia. But the severe fighting that has taken place indicates that from the start the odds were against the invasion's turning out to be a success, even if the weather—which has been worse than anyone anticipated—had been favorable.

In the third week of February, taking advantage of the mist and of the fact that invading South Vietnamese vehicles and armor had been slowed if not bogged down, the North Vietnamese troops of General Vo Nguyen Giap—whose response to the new developments in Laos had been described by associates in Hanoi as "enigmatic and smiling"—struck back hard at the advanced South Vietnamese fire bases. Giap's strategy has always been to wait and adapt himself to whatever new situation arises. (He did this brilliantly against the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.) Faced with heavy American air support of the South Vietnamese ground troops, he at first decided to pull

March 10, 1971

back, apparently on the theory that the South Vietnamese attack would not be a major one of long duration. Then, when the weather got worse, he saw his chance. Still seeking to avoid a major confrontation, he moved elements of three regiments and many anti-aircraft and artillery units south toward the South Vietnamese positions along and around Route 9. First, he threw his heaviest and most modern Russian and Chinese rockets onto his opponents' hilltop posts. Then he sent in sappers and other ground troops, striking at the most vulnerable South Vietnamese outposts and mauling elite Ranger and airborne elements, which, with several thousand soldiers of the best of the regular South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) infantry divisions, the First, composed Saigon's invading force. Shooting from hidden anti-aircraft emplacements—many of them cleverly concealed platforms deep in the jungle that covers that forbidding region—Giap's forces took a heavy toll of American and Vietnamese helicopters delivering troops and ammunition. By February 23rd, about twenty-five helicopters had been destroyed on both sides of the border and at least that many were damaged. Casualties are already heavy, and they could become heavier if Giap decides to throw in more troops and, despite American and South Vietnamese air superiority, risk a larger battle on the ground. In any event, Saigon's early claim that its forces were enjoying a seven-to-one advantage over the North Vietnamese in men killed can no longer be substantiated—if it ever could have been.

At the beginning, the invading troops were obsessed by what one veteran American official calls "the Tchepone complex." Tchepone, on Route 9 about twenty-five miles inside the Laotian border, lies athwart the major invasion path. As a key station on the Trail, it had a hard-dirt airstrip capable of taking the Russian equivalent of DC-3 transports, and, as a liaison and communications center, it had sophisticated Russian equipment for guiding the Trail traffic to destinations farther south, west, and east. According to the invasion plans drawn up by General Creighton Abrams, the American commander in Vietnam, and his Vietnamese counterpart, General Cao Van Vien, Tchepone was to be seized and held, at least long enough for the South Vietnamese to conduct sweep-and-patrol operations around it in all directions in an effort to destroy as many major Trail supply caches as possible. Even after the South Vietnamese began running into trouble from bad weather and anti-aircraft fire, the airstrip remained an objective, although the communications equipment had already been carried off, and it became increasingly apparent that the basic concept of the attack would have to be altered "in time" as well as "in space"—to use the terms President Nguyen Van Thieu used in describing the operation.

By then, though the invading forces had destroyed some sizable North Vietnamese caches near the border, it was only too clear that the success of the attack would be severely limited by the redoubtable complexity of the Trail network. Nine major Trail routes fan down from the Mu Gia Pass and two other mountain defiles in North Vietnam. (These three defiles, through which nearly all traffic passes, have been hit constantly by American B-52 and other bombers over the years, but with only limited success, since pinpoint targeting is extremely difficult in such mountainous terrain.) Of the nine Trail arteries below the passes, the South Vietnamese apparently crossed over three in the first few days of the invasion and found some caches. Much of the truck traffic is believed to use these three routes, but I learned from South Vietnamese sources that the invading forces actually discovered and blew up only a few minor relay depots. From northern Laos down to the Bolovens Plateau,

about a hundred and fifty miles south of the Mu Gia Pass, where the major routes turn eastward into South Vietnam or, dwindling into jungle trails, run on south into Cambodia, there are known to be forty-two major storage centers. So far, not one of these forty-two centers has been reached by South Vietnamese ground forces, though the centers have all been bombed regularly in the past.

The sixteen thousand South Vietnamese committed to the enterprise, it is now clear, were incapable of reducing the total Trail traffic to a trickle. The most that could have been done, military experts now concede, was to slow the flow for a short time—perhaps for two or three months. This might have served the oft-stated American purpose of "protecting" the withdrawal of our troops and helping the Vietnamization program. It seems doubtful, however, under any circumstances short of a miraculous stroke of luck, that a limited Trail attack could have made a really big difference at this late date. Back in 1968, there was serious talk of having American and South Vietnamese troops cut across Route 9 all the way to the border of Thailand. That would have required upward of seventy-five thousand men, and, if it had been synchronized with an invasion of the Cambodian sanctuaries, might have altered the course of the war. Of course, it might also have brought in the Chinese Communists, who are again making noises about responding to "a grave menace." Conceivably, the Chinese could still make an "incursion" of their own into Laos, moving toward Thailand from the northwest along a new road they have been building on and off for eight years. Recently, the Chinese have extended this road from Muong Sai, in the northwest Laotian province of Luang Prabang, to a point fifty miles from the Thai border. They have also extended a road eastward from Muong Sai to connect with one that runs through Dien Bien Phu, in western North Vietnam. The Chinese have some seven thousand troops in northern Laos, mostly engineers but including some combat elements. Yet even if there should be any truth in rumors of large Chinese troop movements into Yunnan Province, in southern China, during the past month—rumors that are not substantiated by responsible Western intelligence reports—most observers do not believe that the Chinese will move in strength into either Laos or North Vietnam to reinforce the North Vietnamese, who don't particularly want them to anyway. Nevertheless, the new west-to-east road can certainly be of help to the North Vietnamese in the attack they have been mounting in northern Laos—an operation that seems to be more serious this year than it has been at any other time since 1964.

Depending on both military and political events, of course, the whole picture could change drastically overnight. The Laos invasion could escalate into a new major war, or it could place the North Vietnamese in such a difficult position that, as the Americans hope, they might be willing to negotiate seriously, or at least seriously enough to give themselves a respite. This is what President Nixon keeps talking about, but it actually seems less likely now than it did before the Trail attack was launched. Another possibility is that as we pull out of South Vietnam the South Vietnamese, primarily as a result of our planning and urging, will find themselves in the difficult position of fighting alone over ever-widening fronts in three and possibly even four countries, the fourth being North Vietnam itself. This might accord quite well with the revolutionary dynamics of the North Vietnamese and their Chinese—if not necessarily their Russian—allies. Though it would strain the Hanoi war machine to the limits of its capacity, it would also gravely interfere with all the paramilitary and political programs that have been undertaken to bring a measure of stability

to South Vietnam, with the result that this beleaguered country, still the prize of Indo-China, would be torn apart beyond repair. Thus, far from having been helped as a result of the Cambodian and Laotian ventures, as many Americans would like to believe, South Vietnam could well be on the way to being lost irrevocably.

One important factor influencing those who conceived the Laotian "incursion" was that the loss by the Communists of the southern-Cambodian port of Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) had made the long overland routes more vital than ever, and therefore more vulnerable. Because of a number of considerations, including terrain and logistics, the Laotian operation promised to be tougher than the Cambodian one, but, perhaps in part out of consideration for public opinion back home, no American ground troops were to take part, as they had in Cambodia. Most of the South Vietnamese divisions (including airborne and Marine elements) are now rated good or better, and giving them a chance to score a victory on their own may have been another factor in the planning. Nevertheless, contrary to some early predictions, the invading troops did not intend to stay in Laos until the end of the dry season, in May, though the possibility may not have been totally excluded. The idea was simply to stay as long, and do as much damage, as possible.

Almost six weeks ago, General Abrams' intelligence sources detected movements of North Vietnamese ground troops south toward the Demilitarized Zone. (The equivalent of about four divisions had been poised north of the Zone.) Even before the decision was made to go into Laos, it was decided to place an American blocking force along Route 9 in Quank Tri Province, where, at Khe Sanh and elsewhere, some of the fiercest fighting of the war had previously taken place. This was considered a separate preemptive measure, and it would have been taken no matter what occurred in Laos. From a public-relations standpoint, the airlift north from Saigon at the end of January of this American force and of the first South Vietnamese forces for the Laotian operation was badly botched. The now famous "embargo" of any news about troop movements in the northernmost military region of South Vietnam (Military Region 1) was quickly breached, simply because no one told correspondents they were not allowed to "speculate"—in fact, they were virtually given a license to go ahead and do so—and because, by mistake, some Japanese and Korean writers attended a briefing at American military headquarters that was supposed to be restricted to American correspondents and to one representative each from Reuters and Agence France-Presse. When the Japanese wrote stories about what they had heard (and one or two American correspondents managed to tip off their home offices), there was intense speculation in Washington about an invasion of Laos, and the possible use of America's airpower "anywhere in the Indo-China area" was also discussed by various Administration spokesmen.

The entire operation has been marked by an absence of accurate information and a plethora of misinformation. During President Nixon's press conference of February 17th, more than a week after the invasion had begun, he said that "the South Vietnamese have run into very heavy resistance on the road into Tchepone." It seems that in a cable from military headquarters in Saigon a "not" was inadvertently dropped out after the word "have"—at that point there was virtually no resistance on the ground and, furthermore, the South Vietnamese had scarcely got started on the road to Tchepone. The President made a number of additional statements that can at best be described as rash, such as his declaration that the Communists "have to fight here"—which is to say, where the Trail

is—"or give up the struggle to conquer South Vietnam, Cambodia, and their influence extending through other parts of Southeast Asia." Even the most sanguine American generals in South Vietnam never regarded the invasion as more than a temporary effort to stem the flow of men and supplies, and, from General Abrams on down, they fully expected the North Vietnamese to start building new trails at once. ("They never quit," one officer said.) There are few, if any, political observers who would agree with the President's statement that the long-term capabilities and intentions of the North Vietnamese might be seriously affected by the invasion.

In refusing "to place any limitation upon the use of air power," except for banning the use of nuclear weapons, the President indicated that his orders would apply even if the South Vietnamese decided to attack the Communists in the southern part of North Vietnam. Frequently mentioned by South Vietnamese hawks as likely targets are Vinh, about a hundred and fifty miles northwest of the D.M.Z., and Thanh Hoa, still farther north. Though commando raids cannot be ruled out—in fact, small ones have taken place regularly, and Hanoi also claims that defoliation raids have been made just above the D.M.Z.—one can only wonder how thinly the South Vietnamese can possibly spread themselves, what with the invasion of Laos, the activities in Cambodia, which have been stepped up considerably in recent weeks, and the preparations that are being made to deal with anticipated new Communist offensives across the Laotian and Cambodian borders in the highlands of South Vietnam. Some of the best South Vietnamese generals have recently adopted a very self-confident manner, but there is tragic irony in a joking remark made to an American visitor several weeks ago by General Do Cao Tri—who has just been killed in a helicopter crash en route to Cambodia. The visitor, a congressional investigator, asked Tri how far he intended to go. Tri, probably the ablest of the South Vietnamese generals, waved his swagger stick at his questioner and replied, "India!" The American blanched. Surely, at this point, an attack on North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese forces under American air cover could lead only to further disaster, and might well set off a larger Asian war.

The war in northern Laos, some three hundred miles northwest of the action around the Ho Chi Minh Trail, has no immediate military bearing on this action, but it is bound to affect the course of political events in Laos and produce military repercussions throughout Indo-China. In brief, the Communists, who have been launching annual attacks during the dry season in the provinces of Sam Neua, Xieng Khouang, and Luang Prabang, in northern Laos, are at least three weeks ahead of last year's schedule. Elements of two North Vietnamese divisions, supported by Pathet Lao (native Communist) troops and porters, are threatening the two large bases of Long Tieng and Sam Thong, which are operated by General Vang Pao and supported by the C.I.A. Despite reinforcements by Royal Lao Government and Thai forces, the chances that the two bases will fall to the Communists are greater at this moment than ever before. The North Vietnamese are attacking hard from the northern rim of the Plaine des Jarres and have also moved west, again threatening the royal capital of Luang Prabang. They are likely to harass that capital and turn to the south to control the road to the administrative capital of Vientiane, which might also be subjected to harassment. King Savang Vatthana, who has been courted by Hanoi for the past two years, is under heavy pressure from the North Vietnamese in the east as well as from the Pathet Lao and the Chinese Communists to

the north and east of his capital, and under these circumstances Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister in Vientiane, might be forced to resign or face being overthrown by a right-wing generals' coup. He might resign anyway. He has offered to in the past, but his bluff has never been called by the right-wingers. It is hard to imagine how Laos could survive without Souvanna, but he himself may have come to believe that by stepping down, if only temporarily, he might be in a better position to bring about some sort of political solution for his country's problems.

Though Souvanna issued a mild statement of objection to the joint South Vietnamese-American action against the Trail, he has repeatedly made the point during the past year that what happens there is no longer his business but, rather, that of Hanoi and Washington. The right-wing generals have long been discontented with Souvanna's efforts to effect a political compromise with the Communists in Laos, which would restore the coalition government established in 1962 but would increase the Communists' strength in it. Souvanna has regularly insisted that the North Vietnamese must first get out of Laos, but since this now seems more unlikely than ever, the right-wingers have become increasingly impatient with him, and they therefore welcomed the invasion in the hope that it would bring the issue to a decision. When the invasion began, Prince Souphanouvong, Souvanna's half brother, who is the leader of the Pathet Lao, recalled the delegate who had been in Vientiane negotiating with Souvanna on beginning new peace talks to restore the 1962 formula. Souphanouvong also called on all the Lao people, including elements of the Army, to rise up against his half brother's Vientiane government, which he described as a "stooge" of the Americans; in effect, he all but urged the rebellious right-wing officers to move against Souvanna. Souvanna has since ordered a general mobilization under the leadership of officers he thinks he can trust, but his situation remains extremely precarious. The more ardent right-wingers, both in the Vientiane area and in the south, are biding their time, but if the situation gets worse in the north and along the Trail, and if the central and southern heartland of Laos is threatened by more Communist pressure, Souvanna could very well be ousted. The right-wingers would then openly seek increased military help from the Thais and the Americans, and this would be another way in which the scope of the Indo-China war would be further broadened, with consequent international complications.

Ignoring the open North Vietnamese aggression in northern Laos, Souphanouvong and his followers have taken advantage of the Trail invasion to call on Russia and England, the cochairmen of the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, to "take effective and firm measures to compel the United States and its lackeys to halt their aggressive operation immediately." Poland, which, along with Canada and India, is a member of the International Control Commission set up under the Geneva formula—and which has for years been chiefly responsible for stalling the Commission and keeping it from functioning—has belatedly seconded Souphanouvong's complaint. There seems little the Commission or any other international body, including the United Nations, can do right now to keep the war from spreading. The Communists are surely not going to relax their pressure on Laos, and if they repel the Trail invasion their appetite for gains in that country is likely to be even greater. Souvanna will thus become increasingly isolated, especially since the southern Lao of the Champassak family—notably Prince Boun Oum and the generals around him—will undoubtedly seek to save their own

skins. General Phasouk Soml, the only good "fighting general" in the country besides Vang Pao, has been doing practically nothing in Pakse, on the Mekong, for several months while the Communists have overrun most of the Bolovens Plateau, widening the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in order to funnel men and materiel into Cambodia as well as into South Vietnam. If Souvanna and his weary Royal Lao Government forces should be able to hold out until May, when the dry season ends, the situation could again become "normalized," as they say in Vientiane, and Souvanna's and Souphanouvong's delegates might resume negotiations. However, the chances that these talks could get anywhere are not nearly as bright as they seemed a few weeks ago. If Souvanna should fall, a markedly conservative alliance of "practicality" would undoubtedly take his place, and even without a wider war the Nixon Administration's policy would be put to a new test. How far would the President go to help such a new combination of shady "allies" save their territory and their long-held political and commercial privileges? Would he supplement the C.I.A.'s long-existing counter-insurgency support to General Vang Pao with a new military-assistance program for the rest of Laos, and send Military Equipment Delivery Teams (MEDT is the newest acronym for American advisers) to central and northern Laos to stop the Communists, as he is doing in Cambodia? And how would Congress and American public opinion react to that?

The situation in Cambodia, which must also be taken into account, is no less difficult. In recent days, the Communists have continued to apply pressure on the Phnom Penh government, which is being run by Acting Prime Minister Sirik Matak in the absence of General Lon Nol, who suffered a stroke several weeks ago and is now recuperating in Hawaii. Immediately after Lon Nol became ill, there was some fear that there might be a power play by a group of officers who were disturbed about the slow pace of the government's fight against the Communists, but Sirik Matak has so far given every indication that he will prove to be an able administrator; though there have been rumblings among students and intellectuals about corruption and inefficiency, no upset has taken place. This relative stability can possibly be attributed to the presence of more and more American advisers upon whose continuing aid Cambodia obviously depends. The total of MEDT personnel inside Cambodia is only about a score, but about sixty more who are based in South Vietnam shuttle in and out by way of the Phnom Penh airport. (Late in January, the airport was partly destroyed in a Communist raid, and the Cambodians lost most of their small air force of T-28 fighter-bombers and helicopters and other small planes and equipment. Both the Americans and the Australians had warned them that such an attack was to be expected, but the casual Cambodians did nothing to avert it.)

The South Vietnamese invasion of Laos coincided with a new "incursion" of more than fifteen thousand South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia. This action, being carried out by crack troops that had originally been commanded by the late General Tri, has been concentrated in the same sanctuary areas across the border that were struck last May, but this time Tri was hoping to go northwest to Kratie on the Mekong. No matter what purposes the Communists may be hoping to accomplish in Cambodia—whether to topple the Phnom Penh government or use the country as a springboard for fresh offenses in South Vietnam—the Kratie area is probably their main communications and supply center. Fighting in relatively flat country, Tri soon ran into trouble, as was the case in Laos, and had to send for reinforcements. By the third week in February—just before he was killed—he had still not

March 10, 1971

reached his first main objective, which was the bend of the Mekong north of the vast Chup rubber plantation, and so he was still a good sixty miles from Kratie.

At this point, it should have been quite apparent that the Americans as well as the South Vietnamese had all along underestimated the Communists' capacity for continuing to fight on all three Indo-China fronts, despite the loss of the port of Kompong Som and the difficulty of sending fresh supplies, especially ammunition, down the Trail. Perhaps the Communists had hidden some supply dumps west as well as east of the Mekong long before the attacks on their sanctuaries last May; they may also have managed to get a lot of what was in the sanctuary areas out before the Allied attacks occurred. At any rate, they obviously have enough materiel to keep up a staunch fight and to go on cutting all the main Cambodian highways virtually at will.

There is no doubt that the Cambodians are becoming better fighters; their army of some thirty thousand ill-trained troops has now grown to a force of more than a hundred and fifty thousand which is beginning to learn the rudiments of spreading out along the sides of the roads to avoid ambushes and is beginning to dig trenches at night. In view of these and other changes, many observers here believe that the Communists may make a serious attempt to overthrow the government before it grows too strong. American supplies, especially M-16 rifles, have undoubtedly made a difference, but the difference has created new problems for the Americans. As one European diplomat here put it, "It's a rule that when you help someone very weak you create a link by which your fortunes are bound to his." Americans in Phnom Penh now privately admit that the United States has committed itself to helping Cambodian indefinitely. This may involve more help than some people imagine. Perhaps the clearest indication of the Communists' intentions has come from a defecting North Vietnamese lieutenant, Tran Van Hong, who said late in January that Hanoi has formulated two strategies for Cambodia—designated as "a glass half full of water" and "a glass full of water." The former phrase, Hong said, denotes using the North Vietnamese, the Vietcong, the local Khmer Rouge, and elements still supporting the deposed Prince Sihanouk to occupy as much of the countryside as possible, gain food supplies, build up an infrastructure among the Khmer population, denote moving as fast as possible to establish a Communist government in Phnom Penh.

Sihanouk, who in late January and early February was allowed by his Chinese Communist "hosts" in Peking to visit Hanoi and Sam Neua, in Laos, and then to return to China, is obviously in favor of the "full-glass" policy, insisting that his government-in-exile, the National United Front of Kampuchea, has now "liberated" two-thirds of Cambodia's territory and half of its population of more than seven million. Though Sihanouk has made fresh appeals for unity and solidarity throughout Indo-China since the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, it seems clearer than ever that his principal use to Peking and Hanoi is as window dressing. Lieutenant Hong remarked that the Communists knew eight months before Sihanouk was deposed last March by Lon Nol that he was on his way out—a statement that lends further credence to the conclusion that the Chinese do not take him very seriously, since they apparently took no steps to save him. Even if Sihanouk should someday be permitted to return to Cambodia as a Communist puppet, he wouldn't be allowed to stay there long, and he himself has all but admitted this in some recent speeches. The man whom Peking has designated to head a new Cambodian regime seems to be a former

Paris exile named Thiounn Prasith, whose present job is described as Minister for the Coordination of Efforts of the Struggle for National Liberation. Hanoi has a different choice—Son Ngoc Minh, an alias for an underground Khmer leader who has not been heard of in some time but who is believed to be somewhere around Kratie or farther north.

Whatever differences North Vietnam may have with its allies, and whatever difficulties it may be experiencing internally, one thing that is abundantly evident is that Hanoi's leaders are determined to prosecute the Indo-China war to a successful conclusion, no matter how long it lasts and how many lives it takes. This determination is matched in strength by a determination to remain independent of both Moscow and Peking in as many ways as they can, despite their need for military supplies. Ultimately, the policy may prove suicidal, but one must always remember that the Vietnamese people have been at war for most of the last two thousand years and that they are both inured to it and obsessed by a desire for unity, which they have very seldom enjoyed. Consequently, if in the pursuit of that elusive goal the North Vietnamese at present appear to be courting their own destruction, one must also remember that the South Vietnamese have been unable to get together and create anything approaching a non-Communist version of North Vietnam's solidarity. To say that North Vietnam is a dictatorship is far too simple. It is one, of course, but Thieu's government in the South also has many dictatorial aspects—shadowy and ineffectual though they may be—and is far less given to self-appraisal and self-criticism. Right now, the North Vietnamese, tired of war but morally exalted, are making effective use of the Communist process of self-examination, which results in fresh exhortations to fight harder and make more sacrifices. And the people are being offered as their own "light at the end of the tunnel" the prospect of eventual victory and domination of the entire Indo-China peninsula.

Under these circumstances, the recent extension of the war in Indo-China, with the South Vietnamese spreading themselves thin as the Americans leave, may be just what Hanoi wants. In the past month, Le Thanh Nghi, the Hanoi Politburo's leading economic expert, paid visits to Peking and Moscow. In both capitals, he exacted promises of continued all-out aid. A chorus of propaganda has since been heard throughout the Communist world, warning the United States of the consequences of the new move in Laos, which one Moscow writer said might lead to "the Koreanization of the Indo-China conflict." The Chinese have been even more bellicose than usual. In mid-February, Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien said, "The revolutionary situation is getting better and better," and, after praising the North Vietnamese for "raising the national revolutionary war against imperialism to a new level," he declared, "The Chinese people will on no account permit the United States aggressors to ride roughshod over Indo-China." Inevitably is cheap, of course, and it may only be that Peking is prepared to fight to the last North Vietnamese—just as, to a lesser but nevertheless sadly comparable degree, there are increasing indications that the Nixon doctrine implies an American willingness to fight to the last South Vietnamese.

Within North Vietnam, there continue to be incessant campaigns for the improvement of various cadre elements, and so far the campaigns are clearly not producing results. Oddly, on the day after the Laos invasion Hanoi announced that the election for the fourth North Vietnamese National Assembly, three years overdue, would be held on April 11th. This will be the first such election held since 1964, and the fact that it is being called now, under the leadership of Truong Chinh,

the chairman of the Assembly's standing committee—who at least for a time appeared to be the chief rival of Le Duan, First Secretary of the Workers' Party, for the mantle of the late Ho Chi Minh—may be connected with reports that Chinh is dying of cancer.

Now that Chinh, who is known to be pro-Peking, realizes he will not be around much longer, he may want to leave as many of his supporters in power as possible. On the other hand, there are those who maintain that the power struggle in Hanoi is a superficial matter and that Le Duan and Truong Chinh are agreed on persevering to ultimate victory, whether this takes a few more years or a full decade. In sum, the differences may be over minor questions of priorities rather than over basic strategy, and this could be one reason the North Vietnamese feel that they can afford the unusual luxury, for a Communist country, of airing their differences in public, as they have been doing in a surprising number of pronouncements and speeches. These statements range from detailed accounts of grave economic and management problems, especially in agriculture, to criticism of the failures of workers' and peasants' organizations to perform better—both ideologically and in terms of production. The theme underlying the usual Communist self-flagellation is one of supreme confidence, and if there is an anti-Communist underground waiting to be summoned to action in North Vietnam—as some South Vietnamese, American, and neutral observers maintain—Hanoi is obviously convinced that it can be smothered by a certain amount of controlled criticism and dissent, to the accompaniment of chauvinistic appeals for more patriotism and party loyalty.

The situation in South Vietnam is far different. There is less nationalistic fervor, more concern for personal goals, and scarcely any loyalty to a cause or a man, including President Thieu. Thieu, already campaigning to be reelected, not only is concentrating on building up his apparatus of military men and government bureaucrats around the country but is travelling about more, and attempting to play the democratic politician by joking with his audiences. During Tet, the Vietnamese New Year, he is said to have spent some twenty million piastres—the current rate of exchange is two hundred and seventy-five piastres to the dollar—on printing and distributing more than a million fancily printed personal greeting cards (they were virtually small pamphlets); these were handed down the line through province and district chiefs to village chiefs and, eventually, a miscellaneous collection of citizens, ranging from rich businessmen to cyclo drivers. The trouble with Thieu, his critics contend, is that he has a political apparatus but no firm policy. (This, of course, can also be said of just about all South Vietnamese politicians.) One of the Vietnamese I have known longest and admire most remarked recently on "the sense of malaise and the immobility that still characterize this administration." There is a persistent atmosphere of intrigue and uncertainty, he said, despite the obvious progress in some areas of pacification and in the steadying of the economy. "The political air must be cleared," he went on, "but this is difficult to manage when there are so many indefinite factors, such as not knowing what either the Communist or the Americans are really going to do next year or the year after." This appraisal points up one of the dangers of escalating the war into Laos now, at a huge cost in money and possibly in men. Most experts believe that President Nixon wants to have no more than fifty thousand Americans left in the country by mid-1972—though some recent reports put the figure closer to a hundred thousand—but, whatever the number turns out to be, no one has as yet come up with an inexpensive way to fight a three- and possibly four-front war, which

March 10, 1971

is still costing the United States about fourteen billion dollars a year. (Three, or sometimes four, billion dollars annually is generally regarded as the maximum the Congress would allocate to South Vietnam once most of the American troops have left.) Gerald Hickey, of the Rand Corporation, observed the other day, "The next thing that has to be done is to Vietnamize Vietnamization, and no one has thought that through yet."

The question of what the American role will be in the forthcoming South Vietnamese elections—for a new House of Representatives, late in August, and for President, early in October—is an increasingly touchy one, particularly since so much hinges, both for Thieu and for Nixon, on the progress of the military campaigns in Cambodia and Laos and on the degree of stability that can be maintained in Vietnam under the present process of Vietnamization. One astute American military leader took note of this problem the other day by commenting that it is all well and good to be happy about the progress ARVN has made but that if the rest of the present program fails to hold together—the improvement of the police and the territorial forces; the establishment of proper lines of authority for pacification all the way from Saigon, at the top, down to the villages and hamlets; and the economic programs to help ordinary people struggling to make ends meet—the whole structure will collapse and the Communists will take over. Most of the American bureaucracy, in Saigon and throughout the country, remains optimistic—though its most experienced members are less so, and skeptics have usually turned out to be the soundest prophets here. Most of my Vietnamese friends remain cynical and despairing, but then that is their nature. There has been a steady increase in xenophobia here, and, particularly, a growing anti-Americanism. For this reason, and because the policies of Thieu—never a popular figure—are so closely tied in the eyes of all Vietnamese to American policies, most people agree that the best thing President Nixon could do now is make it emphatically clear that Washington will remain completely neutral in the forthcoming Presidential contest.

Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky assured me two weeks ago that he would definitely run for President, on a platform of "unity, integrity, social reform, and social justice," and that under no circumstances would he be Thieu's running mate again. The American mission insists that Ky will either run with Thieu once more or stay out of the race. A few days after I spoke with Ky, he saw Thieu and spoke to him openly about the political issue, thus beginning to untie the knot that has bound them together so uncomfortably. The two men now apparently detest each other, and I doubt whether even the Americans can bind them together again. If the Americans tried, all sorts of trouble might ensue, including the kind of chaos and violence that followed the overthrow of President Ugo Dinh Diem, in 1963. Whether Ky follows through on his decision to run or, as has been hinted, decides to make some sort of bargain on the Presidency with former General Duong Van Minh (Big Minh, who was once chief of state, the Americans are surely underestimating Ky's perseverance and his drawing power. He is popular with many young military men, with wide segments of the country's youth in general, and with many Catholics; he is even improving his standing among the Buddhists, whom he crushed during the so-called Struggle Movement in 1966, when he was Prime Minister. Money, of which Thieu has plenty, is a problem for Ky, but he is confident that in the next few months he can raise enough to run. People here are always willing to make bargains, and there are enough rich Vietnamese and resident non-Communist Chinese

around to bargain with Ky and support either him or Minh against Thieu, who has made many enemies and, quite apart from his failure to fill the stomachs of the poor and of people on fixed salaries, is still widely regarded as being too isolated and too devious.

"No Northerner can be President of this country," the Americans say with assurances they have said so many things before, only to be proved wrong. The fact that Ky is from the northernmost part of North Vietnam is a mark against him, but things have changed over the years in South Vietnam, and many people here are now beginning to realize that if the South is to survive in its struggle with the North it may be sensible to come up with a Northern-Southern mixture in their leadership. Thieu himself, who comes from central Vietnam, is surely aware of this as he shops around for an alternative running mate. As for Minh, a southerner, he is still undecided about whether to run. He probably will, but, unlike Ky, he vacillates, believing one day that he can beat Thieu and musing the next upon the impossibility of a fair election as long as Thieu controls the nation's military and civilian bureaucracy and its purse strings. If Minh doesn't run, it will perhaps be because he is figuring on improving his chances by biding his time, in the belief, which he shares with a number of other Vietnamese, that Thieu, if he were reelected, would not be able to sustain himself in power for another four years. If all three men run, and if Ky and Minh agree not to attack each other and perhaps even agree that one will withdraw in favor of the other at a propitious moment, Thieu could lose.

In the light of the uncertain military and of the Communists' apparent intention of doing no negotiating in Paris until after the October election in South Vietnam—and possibly none until after the American election of 1972—it becomes increasingly important that a fair vote be cast here, both for the new House of Representatives and for President. Not only does the future of the still hazy Vietnamization program hang on it but the whole American policy of prematurely force-feeding Western-style democracy to the Vietnamese will very probably be put to its final test. Of course, all this must be seen against the backdrop of international politics. If Moscow and Washington show any ability to agree on some other issues—notably, on strategic-arms-limitation talks and on the Middle East—it is conceivable that they might, together, apply enough pressure to force a neutralization of the whole Indo-China area, which is what many South Vietnamese are now urging. This might momentarily outflank Peking, and thus arouse its anger as well as Hanoi's, but in the long run both the Chinese and the North Vietnamese would also benefit by such an outcome. For the fundamental truth is that there can be no winners in this awful war, and that some sort of compromise or accommodation is the only way out for everyone.

SENATOR RICHARD B. RUSSELL

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, Woodrow Wilson once said:

There is no question what the role of honor in America is. The role of honor consists of the names of men who have squared their conduct by ideals of duty.

Such a man was Richard Brevard Russell, Governor of, and then Senator from, the State of Georgia, President pro tempore of the U.S. Senate, and chairman, successively, of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Very early in life Dick Russell must have "squared his conduct by ideals of duty," for he was a gentleman in the finest sense of the word, one with ingrained integrity and a deep devotion to those principles which he believed best for the people of his country and his State. In the annals of our land, his name will stand forth always among those most deserving of a place on that roll of honor.

In many ways Senator Russell was almost unique. He combined the simple dignity and forthrightness of the common man with an amazing memory and an analytical power which gave his judgments a profundity envied by his peers. He had an unerring and seemingly instinctive ability to probe to the heart a subject, to elevate its merits, and to reject what was fallacious or superfluous. He possessed a vast storehouse of knowledge, a richness of experience, and a breadth of vision that made his advice sought and cherished by all those who knew him.

In the area of national defense he was preeminent, quick to first discern the needs of the United States, then to act upon those requirements with vigor and determination.

It was back in 1946 when, as Assistant Secretary of War, I first became acquainted with Dick Russell, who in due course would succeed Senator Millard Tydings as chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Those were times of sharp controversy, heated opinions, and brittle tempers, but I found him to be amiable, perceptive, and invariably objective.

In the years that followed, I came to know him well, and learned to cherish, as I do today, the bonds of friendship which grew between us.

Knowledge does not always breed greater respect, but with Dick Russell, to know him well was to enjoy a rare privilege given to relatively few men. My association with him after I became a Senator is filled with treasured memories of pleasant camaraderie, serious discussion, and wise counsel. We were not always on the same side of every issue, but I always respected and appreciated his point of view. He never espoused a cause because it was popular and he never ducked an issue because it was not.

I was on a vacation trip with him in Florida when he first received the news that President Truman had relieved General MacArthur; and the way he handled the subsequent hearings is a proud page in American history and a noble memorial to him.

Just as I feel singularly fortunate in having known Dick Russell, so, too, do I know that our country was graced in having the benefits of his leadership during the 38 years in which he served in the U.S. Senate. His rare qualities as he dealt with so many of the critical problems of those turbulent years have been of inestimable value to the security and progress of our country.

We all do and shall miss Dick Russell, but his memory provides us all, in the Senate and elsewhere, with a desire to accomplish our own missions with integrity and devotion to the public welfare.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR PROXMIRE ON FRIDAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the prayer and the disposition of the Journal on Friday next the distinguished senior Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) be recognized for 30 minutes for the purpose of engaging in a speech and a colloquy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

APPOINTMENTS TO BOARDS OF VISITORS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). The Chair, on behalf of the Vice President, under the provisions of Public Law 207 of the 81st Congress, appoints the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) to the Board of Visitors to the Coast Guard Academy, and the Chair announces, on behalf of the chairman of the Committee on Commerce (Mr. MAGNUSON), his appointments of the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS) and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) as members of the same Board of Visitors.

The Chair, on behalf of the Vice President, under the provisions of Public Law 301 of the 78th Congress, appoints the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) to the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, and the Chair announces, on behalf of the chairman of the Committee on Commerce (Mr. MAGNUSON), his appointments of the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG) and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) as members of the same Board of Visitors.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATE RESOLUTION 9 POSTPONED INDEFINITELY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senate Resolution 9, amending rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate be indefinitely postponed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

(The remarks of Mr. HARTKE when he introduced S. 1162, the Revenue Adjustment Act of 1971, appear in the Record under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I yield my remaining time to the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS).

SENATE RESOLUTION 70—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION WITH RESPECT TO THE NATIONAL NUTRITION SURVEY

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I submit, for appropriate reference, a sense-of-the-Senate resolution on the National Nutrition Survey.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The resolution (S. Res. 70), which reads as follows, was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:

S. RES. 70

Whereas, the Congress of the United States in 1967 issued a mandate to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to make a comprehensive survey of the incidence and location of serious hunger and malnutrition and health problems incident thereto in the United States; and

Whereas, the Nutrition Program of the United States Public Health Service was designated by the Secretary to plan, develop and carry out the mandate; and

Whereas, Dr. Arnold E. Schaefer, Chief of the Nutrition Program, National Center for Chronic Disease Control, Bureau of Disease Prevention and Environmental Control, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, was placed in charge of the National Nutrition Survey; and

Whereas, Dr. Schaefer and his team of experts, using methodology devised in 33 international surveys since 1956, did conduct the National Nutrition Survey in the states of Texas, Louisiana, New York, Kentucky, Michigan, Massachusetts, California, Washington, West Virginia, and South Carolina; and

Whereas, The National Nutrition Survey has been completed with the examination of more than seventy thousand persons at a cost in excess of \$5,000,000, and has produced data approved as valid by the Food and Nutrition Board of the National Academy of Sciences; and

Whereas, official results have been produced on only two states, Texas and Louisiana, in April, 1970, but no other results have been forthcoming, despite the fact that the raw data is available to be fed into computers for results; and

Whereas, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare has announced plans to undertake a continuing "probability survey" without reporting on or implementing any findings of the National Nutrition Survey, but has yet to examine the first patient; therefore, be it

Resolved, that it is the sense of the Senate that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare should, not later than 60 days after the date on which this resolution is agreed to, submit to the Congress the re-

sults of the comprehensive survey, required by Section 14 of the Partnership for Health Amendments Act of 1967, of the incidence and location of serious hunger and malnutrition and health problems incident thereto in the United States, together with his findings and recommendations with respect thereto.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, on April 10, 1967, members of the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty held a hearing in Jackson, Miss. During that hearing, the Senators present heard testimony that many poor persons in Mississippi were suffering the effects of serious hunger and malnutrition. Twenty-four hours later, two of those Senators, Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania and the late Robert F. Kennedy of New York, toured sections of Mississippi's delta to see hunger firsthand. Their report to Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman touched off a controversy in this Nation which is still simmering—and one which is yet to be resolved.

Those two Senators found that women and children showed evidence of acute malnutrition, that families existed without discernible income and were unable to purchase the bare necessities of life, and that many families could not meet the purchase requirements for food stamps. Those two Senators, joined by other members of the subcommittee, dispatched a letter to President Johnson asking him to evoke emergency authority to feed the poor in Mississippi and other States. Within a week, the Office of Economic Opportunity had announced an emergency \$1 million program to help poor families buy food stamps in 20 counties in the South.

The publicity and spotlight of public attention on this Nation's problem of hunger and malnutrition prodded response from the government. The U.S. Department of Agriculture issued a study memorandum which pointed out shortcomings within its own food programs for the needy. The Field Foundation sponsored a medical study in the Mississippi Delta, and its report, "Children in Mississippi," has become part of the legend of hunger in America. It dramatically testified to the horrors of living poor and hungry.

At about that same time, July 11, 1967, to be exact, the subcommittee held further hearings.

Then Surgeon General William H. Stewart testified:

We do not know the extent of malnutrition anywhere in the United States. I cannot say what the extent is because we just don't know.

It hasn't been anybody's job to find out. We can do it all over the world, but not in the United States.

This was an appalling situation. The U.S. Public Health Service had conducted surveys of population nutrition in 33 countries around the world—but we had never looked at our own. Two Senators, JACOB JAVITS and Robert Kennedy of New York, then proposed such a survey of this country.

After being shunted back and forth from committee to committee and from Senate to House, an amendment was finally approved.

The text was substantially as follows: